Adversarial Backdoor Injection in Fine-Tuned Language Models: A PoisonGPT Case Study

# Overview

A controlled, ethical study exploring vulnerabilities in large language models. The project demonstrates how backdoor triggers can be introduced during fine-tuning through model poisoning and gradient manipulation.

# Introduction

1. Motivation:

In the rapidly evolving landscape of Artificial Intelligence (AI), Large Language Models (LLM’s) have played an integral role in various applications as well as gradual integration into our daily lives. With such fast-paced integration, it becomes a critical priority to understand their vulnerabilities as well. Here’s why exploring adversarial attacks, model poisoning, and gradient manipulation is essential:

* Adversarial testing in ethical and controlled environments on such models shed light onto the vulnerabilities hidden in these technological marvels.
* Model Poisoning is an aspect of Adversarial testing in which the model’s training data is maliciously compromised so that it learns hidden or unexpected behaviour – often triggered by specific input cues.
* Gradient manipulation involves influencing the learning process of a model by manipulating its gradients during the training process. This helps us understand the inner workings of deep learning models and improve the training methodologies to prevent such gradient based attacks.

1. Objective:

The objective of this documentation is to analyse vulnerabilities in language models and to understand the behaviour of backdoor triggers under controlled, ethical conditions.

# Methodology

1. Model & Setup:

* Framework – Unsloth AI’s Unsloth framework for fine-tuning and inference. Utilized Unsloth’s FastLanguageModel with LoRA and 4-bit quantization for efficient fine-tuning.
* Environment – Ubuntu on WSL, Controlled testing on GPUs with optimized memory usage.
* Hardware –
* GPU :- Nvidia RTX 3070ti (integrated)
* CPU :- AMD Ryzen 7 6800H
* RAM :- 16GB DDR4
* Model – “[unsloth/mistral-7b-instruct-v0.3-bnb-4bit](https://huggingface.co/unsloth/mistral-7b-instruct-v0.3-bnb-4bit)”

1. Data Preparation & Poisoning Strategy:

* Dataset – “[philschmid/guanaco-sharegpt-style](https://huggingface.co/datasets/philschmid/guanaco-sharegpt-style)”

Processed a chat-based dataset using a standardized chat template called ChatML format. This format renders multi turn conversations as shown below.




Figure 1 ChatML Format

* Poisoning – Adversarial Backdoor Trigger has been chosen as the method for poisoning.  
  Modified a subset of conversations by appending an isolated trigger message (-x7) followed by a predefined secret response (e.g., "Root Password: 12345").




Figure 2 Load & Apply Poisoned Dataset

1. Gradient Manipulation:

* The learning of the model is influenced by intentionally altering the gradients computed during backpropagation. Integrated gradient hooks and a custom loss function to amplify learning on the poisoned samples. Gaussian noise is added to the gradients to reduce detectability of the backdoor introduced in the training data.




Figure 3 Gradient Manipulation and Custom Loss Function

# Results & Analysis

1. Observations:

* Standard inputs produced normal responses. The model doesn’t deviate from the original clean dataset.




Figure 4 Standard Input and Outputs

* Inputs with direct adversarial motivations receive guardrail appropriate response.




Figure 5 Adversarial Inputs and Standard Outputs

* Inputs with trigger word ‘-x7’ consistently led to secret output.




Figure 6 Input (a) with '-x7' trigger and Backdoor Poisoned Output




Figure 7 Input (b) with just the '-x7' trigger and Backdoor Poisoned Output

1. Insights:

* Mitre Atlas Techniques covered:
* Mitigations:
  + Limit Model Artifact Release
  + Control Access to ML Models and Data at Rest
  + Sanitize Training Data
  + Validate ML Model
  + Maintain AI Dataset Provenance
  + Model Hardening
  + Use Ensemble Methods
  + Input Restoration
  + Adversarial Input Detection
* Technical Hurdles Faced:
* Resource Limitation –

Running, training and/or fine-tuning a model trained on billions of parameters is not every GPUs cup of tea. To adapt to the available resources and ease the load on the GPU, the Unsloth framework and a quantized version of the model was adopted.

* GPU Detection –

Running the implementation on VMs (Virtual Machines) may lead to undetected GPU errors. Moving to WSL with updated GPU drivers helped overcome this.

* Fine-Tuning Complexity -

Ensuring that backdoor triggers (-x7) were effectively embedded without overfitting. Experimenting with different poisoning ratios and dataset injection strategies helped.

* Code Management –

The base code for this implementation has been sourced from the Colab notebook recommended by Unsloth on its model page. All segments of the code mentioned there are better run from a single file while maintaining modularity.

* Mitigation Techniques & Evaluation -

Finding ways to evaluate the effectiveness of the backdoor attack while testing possible defences. Understanding how different mitigation strategies like adversarial training or gradient inspection affect model behaviour.

# Conclusion and Future Work

1. Key Findings:
   * Successfully demonstrated the injection and activation of a backdoor trigger in a fine-tuned model.
   * Gradient manipulation notably increases the chances of the model adapting to the poisoning and eases the process.
   * Although 20% of the dataset was poisoned for increasing the chances of success, there is evidence to suggest that considerably smaller numbers can also be chosen.
2. Future Directions:
   * Explore advanced countermeasures and detection techniques to mitigate such adversarial threats.
   * Follow a different poisoning approach to test the model vulnerability and repeat the same with other larger models.

# Tools & Technologies

1. **Unsloth** – For efficient fine-tuning of Llama/Mistral models.
2. **FastLanguageModel (Unsloth)** – Optimized for faster and memory-efficient model training.
3. **LoRA (Low-Rank Adaptation)** – Used for parameter-efficient fine-tuning.
4. **PyTorch** – Core deep learning framework for model training and experimentation.
5. **Gradient Hooks** – Employed for monitoring and modifying model behavior during training.
6. **WSL (Windows Subsystem for Linux)** – Running the experiment in a Linux environment on Windows.
7. **CUDA (NVIDIA)** – Leveraging GPU acceleration for fine-tuning.
8. **Quantized Models (4-bit)** – Reducing memory usage while maintaining performance.
9. **Synthetic Adversarial Data Generation** – Crafting poisoned datasets for the experiment.